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Suppression of Ecological Competition by Apex Predator
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In the framework of Lotka-Volterra dynamics with evolutionary parameter variation, it is shown
that a system of two competing species which is evolutionarily unstable, if left to themselves, is
stabilized by a commmon predator preying on both of them. Game-theoretic implications of the
results are also discussed.
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From the dominant plants in forest vegetation to the
wild beasts in savanna, an often encountered ecological
paradox exists in the form of stabilizing influence of the
top predator. While two species in direct competition
rarely form a stable ecosystem, they often coexist under
the dominance of a common predator [1]. The most illus-
trative example is found in the trophic pyramids, where
the apex predator, the most savage aggressor of all, seem
to act as the key guarantor of the stability of the whole
system [2]. For species with intellectual capacity, this
fact might be explained as a result of conscious effort of
enlightened self-interest. But the peacekeeping function
of the apex predator is so prevalent throughout ecosys-
tems, that the existence of a simple and universal dy-
namics should be suspected.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the struc-
ture and stability of ecosystems composed of competing
species in the framework of evolutionary population dy-
namics [3, 4]. The tool we employ is the Lotka-Volterra
equation with adiabatic parameter variation [5]. In this
approach, the ecological dynamics is determined by the
time variation of the variables representing the popula-
tion of the species, while the adiabatic parameter vari-
ation represents the behavioral evolution of the species.
The viability of a species in this framework is judged
both by the short-time ecological stability of the orbit
and also by the long-term evolutionary stability of the
shifting parameters.
We focus specifically on a system that consists of two
self-sustaining but competing species and an apex preda-
tor who preys over both competitors. We show that the
system evolves towards an evolutionarily stable config-
uration in which the warring preys are tamed into the
peaceful coexistence. This is in contrast to the case of
two competitors left to themselves, in which there are no
evolutionarily stable solution for coexistence, and “arms
race” drives one of the competitors into eventual extinc-
tion. We also show that our results can be interpreted in
a game-theoretic language as the apex predator turning
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FIG. 1: A symbolic diagram showing the pecking order of the
three species system described by (1). The arrows represent
the aggression and predation with the specified intensities.
the prisoner’s dilemma between two competitors into a
collaborative game.
Suppose there are two populations of competing
species x1 and x2 which are preyed upon by a common
predator population y (Fig. 1). We describe the eco-
logical dynamics of this system by the standard Lotka-
Volterra equation
x˙1 = b1x1 − a1x21 − σ2x1x2 − ρ1x1y, (1)
x˙2 = b2x2 − a2x22 − σ1x1x2 − ρ2x2y,
y˙ = −dy + fρ1x1y + fρ2x2y.
Here, b1, b2 are the reproduction rates for species x1, x2,
and a1, a2, the environmental limitation factor to their
growth. The coefficient d is the decay rate for the preda-
tor y, and f , the efficiency of its predation. In the last
equation, a term proportional to y2 could be added for
consistency with other equations, but this can be shown
to introduce simply a technical complication without af-
fecting the main line of our arguments. Also, specifying
separate predation efficiencies for x1 and x2 makes no es-
sential difference, because the result can be turned into
the original form (1) with rescaling of variables. The pa-
rameters ρ1 and ρ2 are the aggression intensities of the
apex predator y towards x1 and x2, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, σ1 and σ2 are the aggression intensities of x1 to
x2 and of x2 to x1, respectively. We assume all parame-
ters to be positive real numbers. At this stage, we treat
all of them as fixed numbers, making no distinction be-
tween the Roman denominated “environmental” parame-
ters and Greek denominated “behavioral” parameters. A
2nontrivial fixed point xi(t) = Xi, y(t) = Y (X˙i = Y˙ = 0)
with i = 1, 2 is given by
X1 =
1
f
· d(a2ρ1 − σ2ρ2)− f(b2ρ1 − b1ρ2)ρ2
a2ρ21 + a1ρ
2
2 − (σ1 + σ2)ρ1ρ2
, (2)
X2 =
1
f
· d(a1ρ2 − σ1ρ1) + f(b2ρ1 − b1ρ2)ρ1
a2ρ21 + a1ρ
2
2 − (σ1 + σ2)ρ1ρ2
,
Y = − d
f
· a1a2 − σ1σ2
a2ρ21 + a1ρ
2
2 − (σ1 + σ2)ρ1ρ2
+
(a2b1 − b2σ2)ρ1 + (a1b2 − b1σ1)ρ2
a2ρ21 + a1ρ
2
2 − (σ1 + σ2)ρ1ρ2
.
The stability of the fixed point is determined by the be-
havior of the linearized map
M =

−a1X1 −σ2X1 −ρ1X1−σ1X2 −a2X2 −ρ2X2
fρ1Y fρ2Y 0

 . (3)
Namely, the fixed point is stable when real part of all the
eigenvalues λ of M determined by
|λI −M | = 0 (4)
is negative.
When the fixed point is of stable, attracting sort,
neighboring orbits form an absorbing spiral in phase
space. We now assume that evolutionary pressure of se-
lection and adaptation are at work. We can then regard
aggression intensities ρ1, ρ2, σ1 and σ2 as evolutionarily
adjustable parameters which evolve along the path that
simultaneously increase the functions X1[σ1], X2[σ2] and
Y [ρ1, ρ2] until they reach the optimal values. There are
several indirect pieces of evidence supporting the exis-
tence of this type of adiabatic evolution among real-life
ecosystems [6, 7]. It is convenient to start with the max-
imization condition for the apex predator ∂Y/∂ρ1|ρ⋆
1
= 0
and ∂Y/∂ρ2|ρ⋆
2
= 0 . We then have the relations
ρ⋆1 =
d
f
· 2a1a2b1 − b1σ+σ1 + a1b2σ−
a2b21 + a1b
2
2 − b1b2σ+
, (5)
ρ⋆2 =
d
f
· 2a1a2b2 − b2σ+σ2 − a2b1σ−
a2b21 + a1b
2
2 − b1b2σ+
.
These conditions give the expressions
X⋆1 =
2a2b1 − b2σ+
4a1a2 − σ2+
, (6)
X⋆2 =
2a1b2 − b1σ+
4a1a2 − σ2+
,
Y ⋆ =
f
d
· a2b
2
1 + a1b
2
2 − b1b2σ+
4a1a2 − σ2+
.
The quantities −X⋆1 and −X⋆2 as functions of σ1 and σ2
act as the “potential surface” for the variation of σ1 and
σ2. In (5) and (6), the notation σ± ≡ σ1 ± σ2 is used.
With the definitions α ≡ √a1a2 and β ≡
√
a2/a1 · b1/b2,
σ1+σ21 2
X1, X2
λ > 0λ < 0
−0.2
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FIG. 2: Fixed point coordinates X⋆1 and X
⋆
2 as functions
of σ1 + σ2. The parameters are a1 = 1, b1 = 1, a2 = 1.2,
b2 = 0.9 and d = 2. Solid line represents X
⋆
1 and the dahed
X⋆2 . The fixed point is stable in the region below α/β but
unstable above αβ. The region in between is unphysical.
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FIG. 3: Fixed point coordinates X⋆1 and X
⋆
2 as functions of
σ1 and σ2. The parameters are a1 = 1, b1 = 1, a2 = 1.2,
b2 = 0.9 and d = 2. In the region σ1 + σ2 < σcr = αβ/2
= a2b1/b2, both σ1 and σ2 have to be decreased to make X1
and X2 larger.
valid parameter range for Xi and Y being positive and
stable (ℜλ < 0) is given by
σ1 + σ2 < min {αβ, α/β}. (7)
That stability requirement is satisfied can be checked by
the fact that all the coefficients of the third order polyno-
mial equation (4) are of same sign within this parameter
range.
The evolution of σ1 and σ2 depends on their starting
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FIG. 4: Aggression intensities ρ⋆1 and ρ
⋆
2 as functions of σ1
and σ2. The parameters are a1 = 1, b1 = 1, a2 = 1.2, b2 = 0.9,
d = 2 and f = 0.7.
values. With a straightforward calculation, we obtain
∂X⋆1
∂σ1
< 0,
∂X⋆2
∂σ2
< 0 : σ1 + σ2 < σcr, (8)
∂X⋆1
∂σ1
· ∂X
⋆
2
∂σ2
< 0 : σ1 + σ2 > σcr,
within the range of (7). The critical aggression intensity
σcr is given by
σcr ≡ max {αβ/2, α/2β}. (9)
If the sum σ1+σ2 is bellow σcr, both σ1 and σ2 will move
toward σ1 = σ2 = 0. Namely, two competing species shall
settle for a peaceful coexistence as the common preys
of a predator y. On the other hand, if the sum starts
above critical value, σ1 and σ2 will increase until one of
the competing species is extinct at that critical value.
The situation becomes immediately clear with a glance
at numerical example depicted in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
A crucial point is that the master y acts as a punisher,
according to (5), that inhibits the increase of σ1 and σ2.
Fig. 4 serves as a graphical illustration of this effect; In-
creasing σi will induce an increase of ρi that incur the
damage upon xi. We stress that no special mechanism is
assumed for y to police the system in the outset, yet the
dynamics seems to explain our common sense observation
about apex predators.
An intriguing fact is that the critical value σcr is in-
versely proportional to the natural population of one of
the prey species, b1/a1 or b2/a2. This means that the co-
existence of competing species under common predator
becomes a less likelier outcome for a system with richer
resources. This seems to give a partial explanation to the
experimentally observed decrease of species at the base
levels of trophic pyramids [6].
We next consider the case where the predator leaves
the scene, namely y = 0 (Fig. 5). By setting ρ1 = ρ2
= 0, we obtain, in place of (6),
X⋆1 =
a2b1 − σ2b2
a1a2 − σ1σ2 (10)
X⋆2 =
a1b2 − σ1b1
a1a2 − σ1σ2 .
The linearized map now takes a two-by-two matrix form
M =
(−a1X1 −σ2X1
−σ1X2 −a2X2
)
, (11)
x1 x2
σ1
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FIG. 5: A symbolic diagram showing the two competing
species described by (1) with ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.
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FIG. 6: Fixed point coordinates X⋆1 and X
⋆
2 for the case
without the apex predator as functions of σ1 and σ2. X
⋆
1 will
increase σ1 andX
⋆
2 will increase σ2 to achieve local advantage,
which will eventually doom X⋆2 to extinction. The parameters
are a1 = 1, b1 = 1, a2 = 1.2, and b2 = 0.9.
in place of (3). The straightforward calculation gives
the condition for X⋆1 and X
⋆
2 to be a viable fixed point,
namely, X⋆1 , X
⋆
2 > 0, ℜλ < 0, in terms of the allowed
region for the aggression intensity as
σ1 < min {α, αβ}, σ2 < min {α, α/β}. (12)
However, within this region, we can easily check the re-
lation
∂X⋆1
∂σ1
> 0,
∂X⋆2
∂σ2
> 0. (13)
Therefore, in this case, both σ1 or σ2 shall eventually
be increased beyond the range (12), and there is no evo-
lutionarily stable coexisting solutions for two competing
species. Namely, in the absence of the common master,
one of the competing species is always driven to extinc-
tion by arms race of increasing σ1 and σ2. An example
of this case is illustrated in Fig. 6
In order to fully understand the generic shape of the
ecosystem, we would have to generalize our arguments
to more trophic levels than two, and also more species
than two within a single trophic level. To this end, this
4TABLE I: The game table X⋆1 [σ1, σ2] for x1 discretized at
σ1, σ2 = a/3 (low aggressiveness, “dove”) and 2a/3 (high ag-
gressiveness, “hawk”). Left hand side is the table for the case
with apex predator (6), and the right hand side, without apex
predator (10). The game table X⋆2 [σ1, σ2] for x2 is obtained
by transposition of raw and column. The Nash equilibrium is
indicated with boldface.
With Apex Predator No Apex Predator
σ1\
σ2 a/3
dove
2a/3
hawk
a/3
dove
3b
8a
3b
9a
2a/3
hawk
3b
9a
3b
10a
σ1\
σ2 a/3
dove
2a/3
hawk
a/3
dove
6b
8a
6b
14a
2a/3
hawk
6b
7a
6b
10a
work, in combination to our previous work, is but a mod-
est start. More involved and sophisticated approaches of
both numerical and analytical nature may have to be
called for [6, 8, 9]. In the current work, no precise spec-
ification for the evolutionary dynamics of behavioral pa-
rameters has been required. While we stress that this is
an advantage, construction and analysis of more detailed
models with such specifications are attractive possibili-
ties.
Finally, some remarks in the broader context of game
theory [10] are in order. There is an obvious game-
theoretic interpretation of the results (6) and (10). For
the sake of simplicity, let us set a1 = a2 = a and
b1 = b2 = b. We now regard σi (i = 1, 2) as the con-
trol parameter of the strategy of population xi for the
game played between x1 and x2 whose payoff tables are
given by X⋆1 [σ1, σ2] and X
⋆
2 [σ1, σ2]. To facilitate the un-
derstanding, the game tables for two discretized points
for σ1 and σ2 are tabulated in Table I. For the case with-
out the common predator, (10), the game is a continuous
strategy version of prisoner’s dilemma [11, 12], whose
outcome is σ1 → a, σ2 → a which leads to the extinction
of either x1 or x2. With the introduction of the apex
predator, the game table is turned into one of collabo-
rative game, whose outcome is the coexistence σ1 → 0
and σ2 → 0. Note that the game table is symmetrized
under the presence of the apex predator; X⋆2 [σ1, σ2] =
X⋆1 [σ2, σ1]. This could be interpreted as the sign of altru-
istic behavior [13]. Advantage of having the apex preda-
tor as a “law enforcer” is evident, and the loss of half of
the populations to the predation would be an acceptable
tradeoff.
In summary, we have established, for Lotka-Volterra
systems with evolutionary parameter variation, that two
competing species are evolutionarily unstable, but can be
stabilized by the introduction of an apex predator. We
hope this to be a start for systematic understanding of
stable ecosystems.
The authors wish to express gratitudes to Professors
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